Islamic Sharia is based on all kinds of general arguments and each general argument has its own application and by combining and cooperating with each other, they form a variety of minor rulings without any real difference between them, and if we find a difference in their implementation, the difference is not in their reason and validity, but in the types and time. The way to identify this is to look for the characteristics of these general arguments, and the result of this article suggests that one of the characteristics of the general arguments is to be in line with the minor rulings in all countries and territories, so that our respected Sharia does not stop us from achieving the development expediency in order to provide suitable solutions for all changes and incidents. The rulings based on expediency cannot be established arbitrarily, but are based on very precise and exquisite criteria and standards, which are realized by great scientists with extraordinary mental power, extensive culture and rare genius. These rulings enable them to master the inference of rulings and not make mistakes. Our holy Shariah is based on narrative and rational arguments, and both types of it need the other, and Shariah rulings are completed with them in the most complete and beautiful way.

Kurmanji uses two morphological forms of pronouns and R-expressions: direct and oblique. The direct form of first and second pronouns (local pronouns) is fully specified for person and number. In contrast, direct third-person pronouns and R-expressions are unmarked; however, these arguments still exhibit person and number agreement with verbs and number and gender agreement with Ezafe heads. There are two approaches to deal with direct unmarked arguments. In the asymmetric approach, these arguments are assumed to be fully specified for relevant φ-features, which are deleted at PF (Phonological Form) after agreement, whereas in the symmetric approach, they are merged as underspecified for relevant features and acquire their interpretation via agreement. Given the prevalence of unmarked arguments in Kurmanji, the symmetric approach is more economical and minimalistic, requiring fewer theoretical tools and computations. The present study shows that the key distinction between local pronouns and unmarked arguments lies in the specification of relevant φ-features. Direct unmarked arguments enter the derivation underspecified for these features, establishing a relation of ‘subset control’ in agreement and acquiring their interpretation by spreading features from the agreeing head at the LF (Logical Form) interface. This study also reveals that agreement in Ezafe constructions and pro-drop sentences also involve subset control and agreement is the only possible way to license φ-features, such as gender in inanimate arguments and person in R-expressions.

Metempsychosis is the concept of the transmigration of a human or animal soul into another human, animal, plant, or even an inanimate object. The theory of metempsychosis poses a challenge to the belief in resurrection (Maʿād), making it necessary to reject metempsychosis before proving Maʿād. Avicenna presents two arguments against metempsychosis. The first argument, found in numerous works, rejects metempsychosis on the grounds that it requires the union of two souls within a single body. Avicenna alludes to the second argument in his Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat but postpones its full explanation to another unspecified work. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Fakhr al-Din Razi, and Qutb al-Din Razi have proposed different interpretations of this second argument. The variations in interpretation revolve around the number of implications Avicenna expressed for this modus ponendo and his reasons for rejecting them. Among these interpretations, only Qutb al-Din Razi's aligns more closely with Avicenna's original words. In the other two interpretations, there are either deficiencies or excesses compared to Avicenna's work.

Three unities are required traditionally in fulfillment on res judicata. In French Law, this condition is provided in art. 1351 of Civil Code. Despite this article, French cour de cassation in a judgment so called Cesareo in 2006, removed the unity of cause from the conditions of res judicata. Subsequently principle of concentration of arguments (principe de concentration des moyens) was established in French Law. In Iranian Law, despite the fact that doctrine does not hesitate in necessity of unity of cause res judicata, in positive law there is no sign of this condition. Accordingly, Iranian Jurisprudence does not regard unity of cause as a necessary condition of res judicata. Creation of Principle of Concentration of arguments in French law and subsequently, appearance of critical discussions about this principle, rendered an opportunity in Iranian Law to reconsidering the conditions of fulfillment of res judicata in positive law and jurisprudence?

Since the emergence of modernity, and in response to its myriad aspects and potentials, which are constantly unfolding, countless reactions have kept emerging in almost all quarters of the globe. A large variety of anti-modern reactions, the common core of which is perhaps the idea that modernity, in one way or another, is illegitimate, stand out among these responses. According to some of these anti-modern responses, modernity has usurped the characteristics and features of religion, which has been the soul as well as the main shaping force of the pre-modern era and has reproduced it in a corrupted form. Two German-speaking philosophers, Karl Popper and Hans Blumenberg, are among the intellectuals who have defended modernity against the onslaught of anti-modern tendencies. In this paper, I briefly, though critically, compare and contrast the approaches as well as some of the arguments of these two thinkers in defence of modernity.

In the classical tradition of arguments for the existence of God, a number of moral arguments have been proposed. Parallel to these arguments, moral arguments against the existence of God emerged. Here a question presents itself: does the existence of moral arguments against God discredit the ones for God and make the belief of theists unjustified? Our claim is that we can propose a new notion of argumentation which shields theistic moral arguments existence against atheistic ones. In this research, we have listed eight atheistic moral arguments and modified them with respect to Mavrodes’ s theory of the nature of arguments; thereby proving that the theist is able to defend his moral arguments and that his belief is still justified. We are of course aware of the fact that this revision of the nature of arguments indicates the justification of atheistic arguments in their own respective viewpoints.

Abolfazl Beyhaqi, no doubt, was a Sunni Muslim, but of what branch of it is open to question. In his Tarikh, there is such a strong belief in destiny that he appears as a fatalist. On the other hand, regarding the responsibility he believes his historical characters had, he does not seemingly deny free will. Moreover, wisdom and rationalism are widely praised there, while he considers the Mo’tazileh rationalists as foes of Islam as Zendiqs (atheists) and Dahris (materialists). So, what religion could it be called? It cannot be marked as Ash'ari because the Ash’aris do not agree with rationalism. They do not even consider distinguishing between the good and bad as a matter of rationalistic practice. They had commitment just to what the Shar’ (Divine Law) knows as good or bad. Besides, they were not in a politically good position until the Seljuk took power in about the latter half of the fifth century AH, while in the time when in Basrah and Baqdad, Ash’ari began to reform religious beliefs, in Samarqand district, Abu - Mansour Matoridi (died in 333 AH) emerged with the ideology close to that of Ash’ari’s. Due to the importance he gave to rationalism, of course not so much as Ash’ari did, he attracted Ash’ari’s students who defended his views as revival of perfect Sunni Religion. Abolfazl Beyhaqi praises Abu Hanifah in his Tarikh; since most Hanafis were Matoridis, he can be considered as “Matoridi”. The present article, comparing and contrasting some writings of Beihaqi with Ash’ari and Matoridi beliefs, brings up and studies the probablity of his being Matoridi.